JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. 490 Maclntyre Japanese, even modern Japanese, are ranked as less individualist, less at least than Americans, to the degree to which, first, they do find resources for moral judgment and action in the established mores of the family, the workplace, and the like, rather than within themselves, as individuals, and, secondly, they view the point and purpose of individual lives as being to serve institutional needs and goals rather than vice versa.
Japanese differ from Americans in respect of the social and individual aspects or components of morality, but rather how does a Japanese view of the difference between Americans and Japanese differ from an American view of that same difference, and in what ways do the concepts in terms of which the Japanese approach this question differ from the concepts which Americans employ. And if we ask this latter question, we shall perhaps discover that the most relevant Japanese distinction cannot be rendered adequately into English as a distinction between the social and the individual. Let me, however, delay in pressing this point in order to raise a second, closely related set of questions.
One stock use of what purports to be a culturally neutral distinction between the individual and the social has been to suggest that wherever in the world modernity has lessened or destroyed the dominance of older, more traditional institutional forms, one and the same tendency towards a strengthening of individualism appears, so producing a convergence in attitudes among the inhabitants of different so-called advanced societies, the type of convergence for the occurrence of which evidence seems to be provided by just the kind of increasing resemblances between Japanese and Americans which Bellah described and predicted in his 1985 "Introduction." But what this thesis of convergence ignores is the specificity of the different historical traditions upon which modernization has made and is still making its impacts, something to which Bellah's work has continuously directed our attention. The individualism of American modernity has one set of highly particular, if complex, historical antecedents; the counterpart phenomena of a Japan invaded by an ever more pervasive market economy and ever more highly developed technological products issue from a very different history. And it is therefore worth considering the possibility that when we compare, as I shall be doing in this essay, that highly specific set of concepts in and through which modern Americans try to categorize and comprehend the human person with the equally specific and notably different set of concepts in and through which Japanese categorize and comprehend the person, we have to do so in a way which presents each as not only the outcome of a past history, but also a stage in a continuing history, one which in each case is as specific as the conception of the self which issues from it. Yet even to attempt this would be, of course, to embark on a huge synthetic enterprise, one far beyond the scope of what I can do in this essay. So let me instead, although in the spirit of that overall enterprise, make three sets of brief remarks, one about the present history of the American self, one about the past European history from which it derives, and one about the Japanese self, and then in the light of these make a modest prediction about the different futures of the American and the Japanese self.
The present characteristic American self I take to be a divided self, often enough a self-divided self. And these divisions involve at least three aspects of the self. From the individualism of the Enlightenment there derives a capacity of the self to abstract itself from the particular social role which it happens to inhabit and indeed from the whole social order of which that role is a constitutive part, so as to reflect upon itself as an individual qua individual, rather than qua family member or member of this or that social group. This ability of individuals to stand back from the social is quite compatible with a recognition by each such individual that he or she is up to this point in his or her life in large part a product of the influences of his or her social environment; but it involves a belief that the individual is free to withdraw him-or herself from these influences and take toward them whatever attitude he or she chooses to For unacknowledged incoherence is the hallmark of this contemporary developing American self, a self whose public voice oscillates between phases not merely of toleration, but of admiration for ruthlessly self-serving behavior and phases of high moral dudgeon and indignation at exactly the same behavior, a self which remarkably often no longer sees incoherence in the promises of its political leaders as a disabling fault. And this is perhaps unsurprising in a moral culture in which radically individualist modes of thought and action are both systematically practiced and praised and yet also systematically put in question, and in which both the practice and praise on the one hand and the systematic questioning on the other are functional prerequisites for a social and economic system in which the self-interested acquisitiveness of the marketplace needs to be complemented and sustained by the kind of cooperativeness that keeps markets in being, and in which the destructive self-expression 493 of those individuals whose overriding priority is their own personal growth and satisfaction is contained, and the wounds deriving from it are healed, by loyalties to just those institutional forms whose disciplines and constraints are in another guise barriers to what is taken to be creative self-expression. In so doing Americans not only try to resurrect from a variety of ethnic, often European pasts capacities for social solidarity and for shared allegiance to commonly acknowledged public goods which presupposed a very different, more unified, less individualist self, but also show themselves unable to make in fact the kind of break with those pasts, the kind of abstraction of themselves from the historically given, which their individualism continually tells them to be possible. What informed a number of those pasts was a theological and metaphysical conception of the self as soul, as psyche, a self which could achieve its own good only in and through its participation in forms of community in which allegiance to the good of the community educated it toward a supreme good transcending the good of the human community. There was in this theological and metaphysical conception a doctrine of the self as having no way of understanding itself in independence of and abstraction from its familial, civic, and other social roles and yet of being more than those roles, just insofar as it is a psyche, a spiritual substance. And it is in key part by reinvoking out of their theological past fragments and remnants of such conceptions of the self, quite incompatible with the self as conceived by different varieties of individualism, that contemporary incoherences are generated.
Japan had no such past. The metaphysics presupposed in Japanese social life at various stages, and articulated in different types of doctrine, has never found any place for the substantial psyche. There does indeed seem to be, at least to an observer as external as myself, a remarkable degree of constancy in the Japanese self through large institutional changes and variations in doctrine. And this constancy seems to be bound up with a mode of organization of the self in which the European and American contrasts and antitheses between individual and society, whether in the older form of a soul whose good transcends as well as includes its social good, or in the newer forms of modern individualism, find no place. Why not?
In a Japanese understanding there is that in the individual which is manifest, which is presented, which is facial expression and spoken words and actions, all of them to significant degrees conventionally ordered, and there is by contrast that which is concealed, what belongs to the heart, the sphere of unspoken thoughts and feelings. The ancient Greek actor also wore a mask, but in the interests of mimesis, of a purposeful representation of action, motivation, and changing response to contingent circumstance, which shows the individual both as tied to his or her social role and as transcending or failing to transcend its or his or her limitations as a result of the flawed judgment of hamartia. The modern Western actor by contrast with both is one complete person pretending to be another, either through the creation of illusion or, less often, through some Entfremdungseffekt. But in both ancient and modern Western cases there is involved in successful dramatic representation a particularization which is designed to point either to a self beyond the role or to a self which is more than its roles.
Consider by contrast what Ernest Fenollosa said of the parts in a Noh play:
The emotion is always fixed upon idea, not upon personality. The solo parts express great types of human character, derived from Japanese history. Now it is brotherly love, now love to a parent, now loyalty to a master, love of husband and wife, of mother for a dead child, or of jealousy or anger, of self-mastery in battle, of the battle-passion itself, of the clinging of a ghost to the scene of its sin, of the infinite compassion of a Buddha, of the sorrow of unrequited love. Some one of these emotions is chosen for a piece, and, in it, elevated to the plane of universality by the intensity and purity of treatment.' Note that all these are emotions-as-exhibited-in-social-relationships. The Japanese emotional self has no existence apart from these relationships. There is no inner self definable apart from the defined relationsips of the social world. Japanese philosophers have never needed a Wittgenstein to correct errors about the inner and the outer aspects of the self; their conceptual scheme affords no temptation to commit those particular errors.
It is not, of course, that every Japanese individual relates to the social world in the same way and to the same degree. The Japanese individual may be more or less successful in completing him-or herself by assuming those
